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Comments and Casenotes
Due Process Objection To Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations Not "Doing Business"
Within The State
ErlangerMills, Inc. v. Cohoes Fiber Mills, Inc.'
Erlanger Mills, Inc., a North Carolina Corporation engaged in the manufacturing of textile products, sent certain agents to call upon Cohoes Fiber Mills, Inc., located in
Cohoes, New York, for the purpose of discussing the possible purchase of rayon garnet manufactured by Cohoes.
Subsequent to this visit, Erlanger placed its order with
Cohoes. Every part of the transaction took place in New
York, including the technical delivery to the buyer through
the shipment of the goods f.o.b. Cohoes, New York.
Erlanger began to use the rayon garnet, but shortly thereafter it complained that the yarn was defective. After
several communications between the parties, the general
manager of Cohoes, one Crowther, agreed to visit Erlanger
and discuss the complaint. While in North Carolina,
Crowther was served with a summons against Cohoes.
Erlanger conceded the fact that Cohoes, up to this transaction, had never done any business in North Carolina, nor
with a North Carolina citizen or corporation, but it claimed
that service upon Crowther was valid under the North
Carolina statute,2 the relevant portion of which provides as
follows:
"Jurisdiction over foreign corporations not transacting business in this State - (a) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State, by a resident of this State or by any person having a usual place
of business in this State, whether or not such foreign
corporation is transacting or has transacted business
in this State and whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce on any cause
of action arising as follows:...
"(3) Out of the production, manufacture, or distribution of goods by such corporation with the reasonable expectation that those goods are to be used or con1239 F. 2d 502 (4th Cir., 1956).
'GEN.

STATS., NORTH CAROLINA

(1955 Cur. Supp. §55-38.1.
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sumed in this State and are so used and consumed,
regardless of how or where the goods were produced,
manufactured, marketed, or sold or whether or not
through the medium of independent contractors or
dealers;"'
Cohoes moved to quash the service on the ground that
this statute was a denial of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. The service
was quashed in the Federal District Court, and, on appeal,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed.
The primary question involved in this case was
whether or not a state may validly pass a statute which
would give it jurisdiction over a foreign corporation upon
a single sale, consummated completely without the state,
but with the reasonable expectation that those goods were
to be used in the state. Erlanger contended that the "minimum contacts" test which was laid down in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington4 liberalized the law to a degree
sufficient to allow a state to maintain jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation which does no more than to ship its
product into North Carolina on one occasion for use in that
state. The Court agreed that the "minimum contacts" test,
did have liberalizing tendencies, but it still could not justify
jurisdiction on the minimal contacts that Cohoes had with
North Carolina. Therefore, the North Carolina statute, as
applied to this case, was found to be invalid.
Though the recent trend in interpreting state statutes
providing for jurisdiction over foreign corporations indicates increasing liberality, in no other case on this point
have there been so few contacts between the foreign corporation and the state. In every other case - whether a
tort action or for breach of contract - the cause of action
arose out of an act which was committed or performed
within the state in which the suit was initiated. Even in
the far reaching case of Smyth v. Twin State Improvement
Corp.,5 the Vermont Court, showing just how little activity
8

Italics supplied by the Court, 8upra, n. 1, 504.
'326 U. S. 310, 161 A. L. R. 1057 (1945).

6116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664, 25 A. L. R. 2d 1193 (1951).

In this case the

defendant, a foreign corporation, came into Vermont to repair plaintiff's
roof. The Job was done in a negligent manner, and the court held that
jurisdiction could be had in Vermont, under the Vermont statute, for this
singular act which took place in*Vermont. The court sets forth the reason
for their decision at page 668:
"No Round reason appears to exist why foreign corporations may not
be held responsible in Vermont for wrongful acts done in Vermont.
If a foreign corporation voluntarily elects to act here, it should be
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was required for the purpose of subjecting a foreign corporation to local jurisdiction, still pointed out the fact that
the tort was committed within the state in which the suit
was initiated.'
In 1937, the Maryland Legislature enacted a statute7
allowing Maryland residents, or persons having their usual
place of business in the state, to bring suit against a foreign
corporation for any contract made within the state or for
any liability incurred for acts done within the state.8 Subsequent to the passage of this statute, the first of its kind,
several articles were written speculating upon whether or
not this "unique" subsection of the statute could be legally
sustained against objections based upon the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' An article, 10 written in Maryland by Professor Reiblich, reasoned that the
statute should be valid in its entirety and stated as to this
part of the statute, "It is submitted, that whatever the
theoretical or conceptual argument that may need to be
raised to support it, subdivision (d) represents a sound
social policy and should be sustainable against the due process objection.""
answerable here and under our laws. The consequences imputed to it
lie within its own control, since it need not act within this state at all,
unless it so desires."
'For a full discussion of the power of a state to subject a foreign corporation to the jurisdiction of its courts on the sole ground that the corporation committed a tort within the state, see the annotation under that heading in 25 A. L. R. 2d 1202.
7Md.
Code (1924), Art. 23, Sec. 118(d), as amended, Laws 1937, Ch. 504.
This section of Article 23 was subsequently changed to section 119(d) In
Md. Code (1939), and is presently referred to as Article 23, Section 88(d),
Md. Code (1951).
'The exact wording of the relevant subsection is as follows :
"Section 88 (Suits Against Foreign Corporations) . . . (d) Every
foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State 'by a resident
of this State or by a person having a usual place of business in this
State on any cause of action arising out of a contract made within this
State or liability incurred for acts done within this State, whether or
not such foreign corporation is doing or has done business In this
State."
In subsections (a), (b) and (c), the suit to be 'brought is qualified as being
against foreign corporations doing or having done intrastate, interstate, or
foreign business within the State of Maryland.
0 Myerberg, Revision of the Maryland CorporationLaw, the Daily Record,
Oct. 15, 1937; Reiblich, Jurisdiction of Maryland Courts Over Foreign Corporations . . .", 3 Md. L. Rev. 35 (1938) ; Note, Revision of the Maryland
roreign Corporation Law: An Advance, 38 Col. L. Rev. 1060 (1938). All
wholeheartedly approved of the statutory jurisdiction over a foreign corporation for acts done within ithe state, and the latter concludes with the
following on page 1078: "The concept embodied in the subsection is at best
embryonic, but may soon find expression In the cases."
1oReiblich, ibid. A discussion as to the probable validity of the particular
subsection concerned is found on pages 67-72.
uIbid, 71.

1957]

ERLANGER v. COHOES

Relatively few states 2 have passed similar statutes,
possibly because of the fear that Maryland had exceeded
its police powers by enacting a statute that might be found
to be unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law.
Because of this, judicial interpretation on this subject is
also extremely limited, and most of the important decisions
seem to have arisen under our own Maryland
on point
13
statute.
The first case in which the specific subsection 4 of the
Maryland statute was mentioned was some six years after
the statute was passed. In that case, 5 the United States
District Court, found that the foreign corporation was doing
business in Maryland, and, therefore, declined to rule upon
the constitutionality of subsection (d). However, the Court
expressed some doubt as to whether this section of the
statute would survive attack upon the basis of a denial of
due process, stating in part:
"We will add, however, that if the conclusion which
we have reached in this opinion be correct, it is difficult to see how the broad provisions in the Maryland
law just referred to can be upheld in the face of the
requirements for due process upon which our conclusion is based. We have been referred to no reported
decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals or of any
other Court which has interpreted that provision.""
It is to be noted, however, that this case preceded the
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington 7 case, and the Court
was still laboring under the old jurisdictional doctrines of
''constructive presence" and "doing business" when the
above quoted statement of doubt was expressed.
'2These states are Arkansas, Missouri, and Vermont, and ithe statutes, in
chronological order are as follows: Miss. CoDE ANN., Sec. 1437 (1940);
ARK. STAT., Sec. 27-340 (1947) ; VT. REv. STAT., Sec. 1562 (1947). However,
there were other states that either had or later enacted statutes providing
for jurisdiction over non-residents or foreign corporations which were
limited to specialized fields. Cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927)
(use of state highways) ; Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U. S. 643
(1950) (sale of insurance within the state) ; Doherty & Co. v. Goodman,
294 U. S. 623 (1935) (sale of securities within the state).
Supra, n. 7.
'

Supra, n.8.

Realty Co. v. Tennessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Co., 49 F.
Supp. 807 (D. C. Md., 1943).
10Ibid, 816.
"326 U. S. 310, 161 A. L. R. 1057 (1945). In this case the entire doctrine
of jurisdiction over foreign corporations was changed, and the use of the
liberalizing key phrases of "minimum contacts" and "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice" first came into use.
15Edgewater
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There was another lapse of seven years before the
specific subsection in question was finally interpreted in
Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Products Co.,"5 a 1950 case.
That case involved two foreign corporations, Bay State and
Reed Roller Bit Co., as codefendants. Plaintiff, a Maryland
resident, was injured when a grinding wheel manufactured
by Bay State shattered while being used on a machine
manufactured by Reed Roller, the latter having recommended the particular type of wheel to be used on its
machine. Neither defendant was "doing business" in Maryland, and the machine and grinding wheel were both purchased from an independent machinery company in Baltimore; nor did either defendant have an office, telephone
listing, bank account, or warehouse in Maryland. The
United States District Court held that service under section
119(d)' 9 of Article 23 was a denial of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment when that section was applied
to Bay State, since there had been no contract or transaction within the State of Maryland. As to Reed Roller,
however, the Court held that they did have jurisdiction
over this company since there was more than mere solicitation - there was an agent living in Maryland with a Maryland registered automobile, and it was this company that
had negligently recommended the use of the Bay State
grinding wheel to be used with its own product. The Court
concluded by stating that there would be factual situations
in which the application of the subdivision of this statute
would be inconsistent with due process of law.2"
This view that a single tort or contract within the state
might not be sufficient to subject the foreign corporation
to the jurisdiction of the state, was short lived. In the next
relevant case,2 ' the Maryland Court of Appeals held that a
"89 F. Supp. 654 (D. C. Md., 1950).
"Again, it is necessary to observe that Art. 23, Sec. 119(d), has been
amended in the Md. Code (1951), and is presently Sec. 88(d) of Art. 23. See
n. 7, 8upra.
"Without unduly extending this opinion, the result of my reflection
about the statute is that it can properly be given valid application to a
limited ewtent. Consistent with the approach adopted by Chief Justice
Stone in the Shoe Company case . . . I think it will be necessary to
test the proper application of the statute by a process of inclusion and
exclusion hereafter to the several factual situations as they are presented. The conclusion in each case must be based upon a fair consideration of all the relevant factors, including, among others, the
nature and extent of the corporation's actual activities within the
state . . ." Supra, n. 18, 662. (Italics supplied.)
'There was one intervening case, Park Beverage Co. v. Goebel Brewing
Co., 197 Md. 369, 79 A. 2d 157 (1951), but the court in this case had no need
to use the statute because the final contract was not consummated within
the state. If, therefore, the North Carolina statute used in the Erlanger
v. Cohoes case, had been the same as the Maryland statute, there would

19571

ERLANGER v. COHOES

single transaction within the state was sufficient to obtain
jurisdiction over the foreign corporation. This far reaching decision, rendered in 1954, was Compania de Astral v.
Boston Metals Co. 22 Even though the ships to be purchased
by Astral were in Maryland, an escrow fund was established here, and Astral inspected the ships and signed the
contract of purchase here, the Court found that all of these
acts amounted to "what was but a single transaction...
While pointing out that there were insufficient contacts in
or with Maryland to say that Astral was "doing business"
here, the Court stated that "the contacts of Astral with t1 e
State of Maryland were sufficient to sustain a suit against
it in this State under the test of due process stated in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington... "24 The holdings
of this and of the Smyth case,25 make it apparent that a
state may validly obtain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation which has performed or committed a single act
within the state, whether that act be one of contract or
tort, without first obtaining actual or fictional consent from
the foreign corporation being sued.2 6 These two decisions
appear to represent the most liberal stand taken by the
courts. The theory upon which the courts have relied in
upholding the constitutionality of these statutes is best
summed up in the International Shoe Co.2 7 case, where it
was said:
"But to the extent that a corporation exercises the
privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of that
state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to
obligations, and so far as those obligations arise out
of or are connected with the activities within the State,
a procedure which requires the corporation to respond
to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances,
hardly be said to be undue."2
probably have been little doubt that the case would have been dismissed
without question, since the contract was made without the state of the
forum, i.e., North Carolina.
'205 Md. 237, 107 A. 2d 357 (1954), cert. den. 348 U. S. 943 (1955).
lbid, 261. For a complete annotation on the validity of statutes subjecting a foreign corporation to jurisdiction for a contract made within
the state, see 49 A. L. R. 2d 668.
Ibid, 265.
116 Vt. 569, 80 A. 2d 664, 25 A. L. R. 2d 1193 (1951).
Olberding v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 346 U. S. 338 (1953), noted in
14 Md. L. Rev. 62 (1954).
,Supra, n. 17.
Ibid, 319. Italics supplied.
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This brings us to the very essence of the problem presented in the Erlanger case, i.e., did the particular section
of the North Carolina statute in question violate the Fourteenth Amendment through a denial of due process of law?
It was the opinion of the Court that it did. The single interstate shipment of goods to be used in North Carolina was
held not to be sufficient contact to allow the North Carolina
court to obtain jurisdiction over Cohoes. But for this bare
association with North Carolina, Cohoes had no contacts
whatsoever with North Carolina. It was Erlanger who
came to New York to negotiate the purchase, the contract
of sale was signed in New York, and the goods were shipped
f.o.b. New York, thereby making Erlanger the owner of
the property before the goods ever left the state. The Court
was unwilling to hold that Cohoes had even a "minimum
contact" with North Carolina under these facts.
Accordingly, since Erlanger came to Cohoes, it is difficult to see how it can be said that Cohoes had any benefit or
protection from North Carolina. This tends to defeat one
of the primary reasons for allowing a state to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, i.e., since the corporation would be protected by the state laws, it should be subject to the state laws as well. Even though it is true that
the recent trend had been towards a broader exercise of
jurisdiction over foreign corporations through the enactment of statutes, criticism2 9 of the existing statutes suggests that the outside limits may already have been reached
in the Astral case,"° relating to contracts, and in the Smyth
case,8 1 relating to torts. If the North Carolina statute were
to be sustained, the doctrine of "minimum contacts" would
afford a foreign corporation little protection, for it could be
required to defend suits initiated in any state into which
its goods were shipped. The question must be answered,
ultimately by the Supreme Court, whether such a result
offends the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" as set out in the InternationalShoe Co. case. 2
The question is a close one, and not all of the weight lies
with the decision of the instant case. The state has, under
its police powers,88 power to enact such legislation as will
See 40 Va. L. Rev. 1083 (1954) and 27 Notre Dame Lawyer 117 (1951).
10Supra,n. 22.
Supra, n. 25.
326 U. S. 310, 316,161 A. L. R. 1057 (1945).
Constitution of the United States of America, Tenth Amendment. Also,
see the International Shoe case, supra,u. 32, 325:
"Nor can I stretch the meaning of due process so far as to authorize
this Court to deprive a State of the right to afford judicial protection to
its citizens on the ground that it would be more 'convenient' for the
corporation to be sued somewhere else."
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protect the welfare of its citizens. 4 The foreign corporation, should there be a hardship in being brought into a
state court under such a statute, could have the case removed from the state court to a federal court," and then
file a motion of forum non conveniens to transfer the case
to another federal court.8 6 Of significance is the modern
trend in defining due process of law: "a trend from emphasis on the territorial limitations of courts, to emphasis
on providing notice and an opportunity to be heard."" In
the Erlangercase both were present: notice directly to the
general manager of Cohoes, and an opportunity to be heard
in North Carolina.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit found that, taking all
of the facts of the Erlangercase into consideration, shipping
goods into North Carolina for use there under one sale,
fully consummated in New York, was not sufficient "minimum contact" with North Carolina to sustain jurisdiction
of its courts. Until reversed, or overruled, Erlanger suggests summarizing the law as being that unless the transaction or act from which the suit arose actually took place
within the state,8 or the foreign corporation has had "minimum contacts" with a state or its citizens greater than mere

use of goods from one out of state sale,3 9 a state cannot subject a foreign corporation to a suit within its jurisdiction.4 0
Whether this decision stands or not, the constitutionality of the Maryland statute4 ' probably will not be affected.
In order to subject the foreign corporation to its jurisdic1,
The foreign corporation has been held to have constructive knowledge
of such laws. See Md. Code (1951), Art. 23, Sec. 85:
"Every foreign corporation doing intrastate or interstate or foreign
business in this State shall be deemed thereby to have assented to all
the provisions of the laws of this State."
"28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1441(b) (1952).
Ibid, Sec. 1404 (a).
Note, The Growth of the International Shoe Doctrine, 16 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 523, 536 (1949).
"That is, unless the final contract was consummated within the state
(Astral case, supra, n. 22) or the tort actually occurred within the state
(iSmyth case, supra, n. 25).
Sf. Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U. S.643 (1950). In
this case a Nebraska mail order health insurance company was held to be
subject to Virginia jurisdiction under 'the rules stated In International
Shoe Co. case, even though the defendant had no other contacts with Virginia than the continual sending of policies into that state.
It is interesting to note that the Court in the Erlanger case concluded
by stating that "the North Carolina statute as applied to this case is
invalid". 239 F. 2d 502, 509 (4th Cir., 1956). (Italics supplied.) From
language such as this one may only speculate as to whether or not the use
of goods shipped into a state on more than one occasion would be sufficient
minimum contact to bring a foreign corporation within the jurisdiction of
the court under a statute similar to the North Carolina statute in question.
1'
Md. Code (1951) Art- 23, Sec. 88(d).
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tion, the Maryland statute requires an act to be performed
or committed within the state. The cases reviewed herein
show almost conclusively that such an act within the state
constitutes sufficient "minimum contact" to satisfy the requirements of due process of law.
GILBERT ROSENTHAL

Maryland Fair Trade Laws Do Not Prohibit Advertising

In Maryland Of Goods To Be Sold Elsewhere
Bissell CarpetSweeper Co. v. Master Mail Order Co.1
Plaintiff manufacturer had established minimum retail
prices for his products in Maryland pursuant to contracts
with Maryland dealers in conformity with the Maryland
Fair Trade Act.2 Defendant operated a retail store in the
District of Columbia, a free trade jurisdiction, with about
one-third of its sales consummated by mail order. Plaintiff
sought to enjoin defendant from "willfully and knowingly
advertising and offering for sale"' in Maryland plaintiff's
products at prices lower than the aforesaid valid fair trade
prices in effect in Maryland. None of defendant's sales took
place in Maryland; all sales were directly to consumers;
and all advertising emanated from the District of Columbia.
The district court denied the injunction,4 and on appeal, was
affirmed. "Since the prohibition against selling (in Sec. 107
of the Maryland Act) is of necessity confined to Maryland
sales, the associated acts of advertising or offering for sale
must likewise be concerned with sales within the State","
and the McGuire Act 6 does not broaden the scope and purpose of the Maryland statute.'
1240 F. 2d 684 (4th Cir., 1957).
'Md. Oode (1951) Art. 83, Secs. 102-110.
'1bid, Sec. 107, is the basis for plaintiff's cause of action:
"Willfully and knowingly advertising, offering for sale or selling any
commodity at less than the price stipulated in any contract entered
into pursuant to the provisions of Sections 102-110, whether the person
so advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party to such
contract, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any
person damaged thereby."
'140 F. Supp. 165 (D. C. Md., 1956).
'Supra, n. 1, 687-8.
i15 U. S. C. A. (1956), Sec. 45(a) (1)-(5). In substance the Act renders
lawful contracts prescribing minimum prices for the resale of certain trademarked commodities, provided such contracts are lawful by statute in a
state "in which such resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to
be transported for such resale". Also permitted is "any right of action
created by any statute ...
which in substance provides that willfully and
knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less
than the price" prescribed in such fair trade contracts is unfair competition. Further, the making of such contracts or enforcement of the aforesaid rights of action shall not be a burden on interstate commerce.
ISupra, n. 1, 688.

